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INTRODUCTION
On September 28, 2011, after thirty-three years on death row, Manuel
Valle, age sixty-one, was executed by the State of Florida.1 In 1987, Valle
shot and killed police officer Louis Pena during a routine traffic stop.2 At
the time, Valle was twenty-seven years old.3
Why did it take Florida over three decades to execute Manuel Valle?
During the first thirteen years after Pena’s murder, Florida prosecutors
struggled to obtain a constitutionally sound conviction and sentence. The
Florida Supreme Court reversed Valle’s initial conviction and sentence
because the trial court forced him to stand trial within twenty-four days of
his arraignment, in violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel.4
On retrial, Valle was again sentenced to death, but this second sentence was
vacated because the trial court improperly excluded mitigating testimony.5
The Florida Supreme Court upheld Valle’s third death sentence on appeal
in 1991, and the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari.6 For
the next twenty years, however, Valle continued to litigate from death row.
He filed a motion for state postconviction relief and federal petitions for a
writ of habeas corpus, all of which were denied.7
1 See Adam Liptak, Lifelong Death Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2011, at A16 (discussing
Valle’s crime and the delay prior to his execution); see also Patricia Mazzei, Florida Executes Cop
Killer Manuel Valle, 61, by Lethal Injection, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.tampabay.
com/news/publicsafety/crime/article1194149.ece (describing Valle’s final moments).
2 See Valle v. State, 474 So. 2d 796, 798 (Fla. 1985) (describing the testimony of a police
officer who witnessed the murder and testified that he saw Valle approach Officer Pena and fire a
single shot at him), vacated, 476 U.S. 1102 (1986); see also Patricia Mazzei, Manuel Valle to Be
Executed Wednesday for Killing Officer Louis Pena, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.
tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/article1193954.ece (“Pena was about to let Valle go when
Valle, standing next to the patrol car, asked if he could walk back to [his] Camaro to get a cigarette.
Pena said yes. Valle returned with a hidden .380-caliber automatic pistol.”).
3 See Liptak, supra note 1.
4 Valle v. State, 394 So. 2d 1004, 1005 (Fla. 1981).
5 See Valle v. Florida, 476 U.S. 1102, 1102 (1986) (vacating Valle’s sentence pursuant to Skipper
v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986)); Skipper, 476 U.S. at 8 (holding that mitigating testimony
proffered by disinterested witnesses regarding the defendant’s good behavior in prison could not
be excluded).
6 See Valle v. State, 581 So. 2d 40, 49 (Fla.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 986 (1991).
7 See Initial Brief of Appellant at 5-8, Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC111387), 2011 WL 3319905 (detailing the procedural history of Valle’s case). After his death sentence
was upheld, Valle filed a motion for postconviction relief in 1997. Id. at 6. The Florida Supreme
Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Valle’s assertion that his counsel during his 1988

2013]

Delay in Considering Inordinate Delay

863

When Florida Governor Rick Scott signed Valle’s death warrant in
June 2011,8 Valle sought last-minute relief from the courts. He raised a new
argument—that execution after such a lengthy delay would violate the
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.9 Specifically,
Valle asserted that his execution was unconstitutional because the State
“added to [his] death sentence the morbid additional sentence of being
taunted with death for three decades—the greater part of his life.”10 Ultimately, however, Florida executed Valle by lethal injection after the United
States Supreme Court refused his petition for stay of execution and writ of
certiorari.11
The Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to address the validity of
the unconstitutional delay claim raised by Valle and other death row
inmates before him. The issue first came to the Court’s attention over
fifteen years ago, in Lackey v. Texas.12 Justice Stevens issued a memorandum
respecting the Court’s denial of certiorari in which he acknowledged that
although “the importance and novelty of the question . . . are sufficient to
warrant review by this Court, those factors also provide a principled basis
for postponing consideration of the issue until after it has been addressed by

resentencing hearing was ineffective for deciding to present model prisoner evidence, which
allowed for the State, in turn, to produce damaging rebuttal evidence; his claim was eventually
rejected. See Valle v. State, 778 So. 2d 960, 967 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam). Valle then filed a state
habeas petition raising four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the Florida Supreme
Court denied in 2002. Valle v. Moore, 837 So. 2d 905, 907, 911 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam). Following
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Valle filed a
second state habeas petition in 2003, which was also rejected. Valle v. Crosby, 859 So. 2d 516 (Fla.
2003) (unpublished table opinion). Valle then filed a habeas petition in federal court in 2003,
raising a total of fourteen different claims, all of which were denied. See Valle v. Crosby, No. 0320387, 2005 WL 3273754, at *2, *77 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2005). In 2006, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the denial of Valle’s federal habeas petition, and the Supreme Court subsequently denied
certiorari. See Valle v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 459 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 552 U.S. 920 (2007).
8 See Mark Caputo & David Ovalle, Scott Signs First Death Warrant as Florida Governor,
TAMPA BAY TIMES ( June 30, 2011), http://www.tampabay.com/incoming/scott-signs-first-deathwarrant-as-florida-governor/1178173; see also Initial Brief of Appellant, supra note 7, at 69 (describing how “[f]or three years and nine months, the Governor of Florida exercised his standardless
discretion to decline to sign Mr. Valle’s death warrant,” before changing his mind in June 2011).
9 See Initial Brief of Appellant, supra note 7, at 9.
10 Id. at 64-65.
11 See Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011); Mazzei, supra note 1 (detailing Valle’s final words
and the moments leading up to his execution).
12 See 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (“Petitioner raises the question whether executing a prisoner who has already spent some 17
years on death row violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.”).
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other courts.”13 Justice Stevens emphasized that denial of certiorari provided
an important opportunity for state and lower federal courts to “serve as
laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed
by this Court.”14 Since Lackey, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari to
every petitioner asserting this argument (hereinafter referred to as a “Lackey
claim”), including Manuel Valle, and thus has not ruled on whether—or
when—executions after inordinate delays on death row constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.
Several Justices, however, have spoken out both in favor of and against
recognizing an Eighth Amendment claim based on inordinate delay on
death row. Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens have long urged the Court to
address a Lackey claim, which, they suggest, has merit. Indeed, Justice Breyer
has dissented from every one of the Court’s refusals to grant certiorari to an
inmate raising a Lackey claim.15 In Valle v. Florida, Breyer noted that he had
“little doubt about the cruelty of so long a period of incarceration under
sentence of death” and further observed that three decades of “confinement
followed by execution would also seem unusual.”16 Similarly, since issuing
the Lackey memorandum, Justice Stevens has opined that execution after
decades-long delays on death row is “without constitutional justification.”17
In contrast, Justice Thomas has repeatedly rejected Lackey claims by
refuting “the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply
of appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when his execution
is delayed.”18 He has consistently maintained that the Lackey claim lacks a
basis in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.19
Despite the considerable amount of time it takes to develop a Lackey
claim, the issue continues to present itself, particularly as the length of time
prisoners spend on death row increases. According to a 2010 Bureau of Justice
Statistics report, from 1984 to 2010, the average elapsed time between
13
14

Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1047 (quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) (opinion of Stevens, J.,
respecting the denial of certiorari)).
15 See Valle, 132 S. Ct. at 2 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of stay of execution). For a
discussion of the arguments that Justices Breyer and Stevens have raised in support of the Lackey
claim, see also infra Section III.A.
16 132 S. Ct. at 1 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of stay of execution).
17 Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 544 (2009) (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting
the denial of stay of execution and certiorari).
18 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
19 See id. (asserting that there is no “support in the American constitutional tradition or in
this Court’s precedent” for the Lackey claim); see also, e.g., Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 544 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the denial of stay of execution and certiorari) (citing Knight, 528 U.S. at 990
(Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari)); Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1301
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (quoting Knight, 528 U.S. at 990).
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sentence and execution for all death row inmates more than doubled,
increasing from 74 months in 1984 to 178 months in 2010.20 With the Lackey
issue still unresolved, and with over 3100 people currently on death row in
the United States,21 courts can anticipate an increasing number of claims
that execution after inordinate delay on death row violates the Eighth
Amendment. Therefore, it is time for the Court to confront the issue and
definitively determine the constitutionality of inordinate death row delays.
Notwithstanding the benefits of the highest court’s resolution of the
issue, the Supreme Court is unlikely to take a Lackey case in the near future.
Since Justice Stevens issued the Lackey memorandum over fifteen years ago,
procedural roadblocks have emerged that have prevented lower courts from
addressing the merits of Lackey claims.22 I argue that in certain circumstances,
execution after lengthy confinement on death row does violate the Eighth
Amendment and the “evolving standards of decency”23 by which the
Amendment is measured. Therefore, states must implement workable
solutions that are carefully calibrated to address both the Lackey claim and
the countervailing policy considerations.
Part I of this paper summarizes the bedrock principles that guide the
Court in analyzing capital sentences challenged on Eighth Amendment
grounds. Part II describes the substance of the Lackey claim and focuses on
the causes of delay on death row and the psychological effect of this delay,
known as the “death row phenomenon.”24 Part III traces the ongoing debate
over the Lackey claim among the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court. Then, Part IV assesses the experiment taking place in the “laboratories” of lower state and federal courts, and concludes that it has been
lackluster, mostly because of the procedural issues that have limited courts’
opportunities to address the merits of Lackey claims. Finally, in recognition
that the Court is unlikely to grant certiorari and rule on the validity of
Lackey claims, Part V focuses on alternative solutions to the problem of
inordinate death row delays.

20 See TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2010—STATISTICAL TABLES 12 tbl.8 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp10st.pdf.
21 See NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH ROW U.S.A. 1 (Fall 2012)
(stating that, as of October 1, 2012, there were estimated to be 3146 death row inmates in the
United States).
22 For a discussion of two of the most common procedural issues encountered when inmates
raise Lackey claims, see infra Part IV.
23 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
24 See infra text accompanying note 84.

866

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 861

I. THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT:
AN OVERVIEW
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.”25 In 1958, the Court observed in Trop v.
Dulles that “[t]he exact scope of the constitutional phrase ‘cruel and unusual’
has not been detailed by this Court.”26 Despite the vague contours of the
Eighth Amendment, from the time of the Framers until the 1970s, courts
accepted the death penalty as constitutional.27
In 1972, however, the longstanding approach to the death penalty began
to shift. First, in a brief per curiam opinion in Furman v. Georgia, the Court
declared that that the “imposition and carrying out of the death penalty
[pursuant to Georgia’s and Texas’s capital punishment statutes] constitute[d] cruel and unusual punishment.”28 Concurring, Justice Brennan
articulated four principles inherent in the Eighth Amendment’s ban on
cruel and unusual punishment: first, a punishment must not be “degrading
to human dignity”; second, it must not be arbitrarily inflicted; third, a
“punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society”; and
finally, the “punishment must not be excessive.”29
Although Justices Brennan and Marshall each opined in Furman that the
death penalty was per se unconstitutional,30 the other concurring opinions
cited narrower reasons for striking it down. Specifically, several of the Justices
found that the Georgia statute facilitated this most severe punishment in an
unconstitutionally arbitrary manner.31 For those Justices, it was not capital
25 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment applies to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
26 356 U.S. at 99.
27 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177-78 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“For nearly two
centuries, this Court, repeatedly and often expressly, has recognized that capital punishment is not
invalid per se.”). The Gregg Court referenced early cases in which the Court had upheld execution
by public shooting and electrocution. See id. at 178 (citing Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35
(1878), and In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890), respectively).
28 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam). Furman consolidated three separate cases, two
from Georgia and one from Texas. Id. at 239. All nine Justices wrote separate opinions in Furman.
Id. at 240. Each of the five concurring opinions, written by Justice Douglas, Brennan, Stewart,
White, or Marshall, was issued by a single Justice with no others joining. Id. at 240-375.
29 See id. at 270-81 (Brennan, J., concurring).
30 See id. at 286 (“[D]eath is today a ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment.”); id. at 358-59, 369-71
(Marshall, J., concurring) (concluding that capital punishment both is excessive and has become
unacceptable to the American people).
31 See, e.g., id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“What the legislature may not do for all classes
uniformly and systematically, a judge or jury may not do for a class that prejudice sets apart from
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punishment itself that violated the constitution in Furman, but the unpredictability of its imposition under the Georgia statute.32 According to Justice
Douglas, the law gave sentencers “practically untrammeled discretion to let
an accused live or insist that he die.”33 Similarly, Justice Stewart concluded
that because “this unique penalty [was] so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed,” particularly on minority groups, its use was cruel and unusual.34
Furman effectively put a halt to the death penalty in the United States
while legislatures revised their capital punishment statutes to meet the
newly articulated constitutional requirements.35 Four years later, the Court
lifted its implied moratorium when it upheld Georgia’s, Florida’s, and
Texas’s revised sentencing statutes.36 These cases, along with two others
decided the same day, are referred to as the “July 2 cases.”37
The July 2 cases outline the basic requirements a capital punishment
scheme must satisfy to comport with the Constitution. Although the July 2
cases ended Furman’s effective ban on capital punishment, the four principles
inherent in the Eighth Amendment, articulated by Justice Brennan in
Furman, played an important role in the Court’s analysis. In the leading
July 2 case, Gregg v. Georgia, Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens declared
that Georgia could constitutionally execute the defendant because its
revised capital punishment statute remedied the deficiencies identified in
Furman.38 Rather than providing the jury with unguided discretion, the new
Georgia law required that the sentencer find and specifically articulate at
the community); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death sentences are cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people
convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the
petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death
has in fact been imposed.” (footnote omitted)).
32 See Michael P. Connolly, Note, Better Never Than Late: Prolonged Stays on Death Row Violate
the Eighth Amendment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 101, 103-04 (1997)
(arguing that the Court held the death penalty unconstitutional because “there lacked statutory
guarantees . . . to protect against the arbitrary imposition of the punishment”).
33 Furman, 408 U.S. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring).
34 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
35 Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution Constitute
Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 152-53 (1998).
36 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (leading case); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
37 See James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing With Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment,
1963–2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28-37 & nn.119-60 (2007). In the two other July 2 cases,
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), the
Court invalidated the challenged state laws.
38 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 (plurality opinion) (“No longer can a Georgia jury do as Furman’s jury did: reach a finding of the defendant’s guilt and then, without guidance or direction,
decide whether he should live or die.”).
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least one statutory aggravating circumstance to justify imposing the death
penalty.39 The Georgia statute also mandated that the jury consider during
sentencing any mitigating circumstances presented by the defense.40 This
revised statute satisfied the Court because it both limited the types of
crimes that made an offender eligible for the death penalty and provided
broad latitude, upon consideration of mitigating evidence, for the sentencer
to recommend life imprisonment rather than death.41 Thus the imposition
of the death penalty was consistent with the principle that “the State must
not arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment.”42
The Gregg Court was also satisfied that capital punishment was not, to
use Justice Brennan’s words in his concurrence in Furman, “unacceptable to
contemporary society.”43 In Trop v. Dulles, the Court had declared that “[t]he
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”44 Since then, the Court has
measured society’s acceptance of a particular punishment based on “objective
indicators,” such as legislative determinations, jury sentences, public opinion,
and even international practices.45 In Gregg, the plurality found not only that
capital punishment was a long-accepted practice in this country, but also
39
40

Id. at 165-66.
See id. at 164 (explaining that the judge must instruct the jury to consider mitigating circumstances as well as aggravating circumstances); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978) (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (“[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”
(footnote omitted)).
41 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-97 (plurality opinion). The plurality in Gregg also highlighted
the additional safeguard of expedited review by the state supreme court of all death sentences to
ensure that the punishment was appropriate. Id. at 166.
Although the statute in Gregg is demonstrative of a constitutionally valid capital punishment
statute, it is not the only permissible scheme. For example, Texas’s capital sentencing structure,
upheld by the Court in Jurek, differed from the system upheld in Gregg in that it did not involve
consideration of statutory aggravating factors. Instead, it required that the jury answer three
questions affirmatively before the death penalty could be imposed. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269
(plurality opinion) (“If the jury finds that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
answer to each of the three questions is yes, then the death sentence is imposed. If the jury finds
that the answer to any question is no, then a sentence of life imprisonment results.”).
42 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
43 Id. at 277; see Gregg, 248 U.S. at 182 (plurality opinion).
44 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
45 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (“The beginning point is a review of
objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that
have addressed the question.”); cf. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (plurality opinion) (“[A]n assessment of
contemporary values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth Amendment.”);.
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that “[t]he most marked indication of society’s endorsement of the death
penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman”—over thirty-five
states responded to the opinion in Furman not by abolishing the death
penalty but by revising their statutes to make their schemes constitutional.46
Another core component of the Eighth Amendment is the mandate that
the punishment not be excessive.47 To meet this requirement, the sanction
imposed cannot be disproportionate to the crime. Additionally, “[i]f there is
a significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for
which the punishment is inflicted, the punishment inflicted is unnecessary
and therefore excessive.”48 The Court therefore must assess the purposes for
which the death penalty is inflicted and determine whether this punishment
serves the goals of deterrence or retribution. As Justice White noted in
Furman:
At the moment that [a proposed execution] ceases realistically to further
these purposes, however, the emerging question is whether its imposition in
such circumstances would violate the Eighth Amendment. It is my view
that it would, for its imposition would then be the pointless and needless
extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social
or public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State
would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of
the Eighth Amendment.49

In upholding the capital punishment statute in Gregg, the plurality deferred
to the judgment of Georgia’s legislature that the execution of certain
offenders did serve these social purposes.50

46
47

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80 (plurality opinion).
Furman, 408 U.S. at 271-72 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also id. (noting that this command
prohibits a punishment from inflicting severe physical or mental suffering, but that “[m]ore than
the presence of pain, however, is comprehended in the judgment that the extreme severity of a
punishment makes it degrading to the dignity of human beings”).
48 Id. at 279 (citations omitted).
49 Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
50 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186 (plurality opinion) (“[W]e cannot say that the judgment of the
Georgia Legislature that capital punishment may be necessary in some cases is clearly wrong.”).
The fourth principle inherent in the Eighth Amendment, according to Justice Brennan, is that
a punishment not be “degrading to human dignity.” Furman, 408 U.S. at 291. He described this
purpose as the “primary principle,” id. at 271, “which . . . supplies the essential predicate for the
application of the others,” id. at 281; see also id. at 286 (“It is a denial of human dignity for the state
to arbitrarily subject a person to an unusually severe punishment that society has indicated it does
not regard as acceptable, and that cannot be shown to serve any penal purpose more effectively
than a significantly less drastic punishment.”). Consideration of this principle therefore takes place
through consideration of the other three principles.

870

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 861

Since these landmark decisions, the Court has continued to further define
the constitutional limits of the death penalty. One way in which it has done
so is by categorically banning the execution of certain classes of defendants.51
In Coker v. Georgia, the Court declared that those convicted only of rape of
an adult could not be executed,52 and in Enmund v. Florida, the Court
prohibited the execution of minor participants in felony murder who were
not present for the killing and who did not “intend[] or contemplate[] that
life would be taken.”53 And most recently, the Court has declared the
execution of insane,54 mentally retarded,55 and juvenile offenders56 to be
cruel and unusual punishment.
II. THE SUBSTANCE OF A LACKEY CLAIM
How does a delay in execution fail to meet the Court’s Eighth Amendment standards, particularly given that the procedural safeguards that prolong
the process are intended to benefit inmates by ensuring that only those
deserving of execution will face this punishment? Before assessing the
treatment of Lackey claims over the past fifteen years, I lay out the substantive argument asserted by the prisoners who have spent a good portion of
their lives on death row.
A Justice of the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether
inordinate delays on death row violate the Eighth Amendment when
Clarence Allen Lackey, who spent seventeen years on death row prior to his
execution, filed a petition for certiorari in 1995.57 Lackey argued that the
State of Texas had forfeited the right to execute him as a result of his
51 See Aarons, supra note 35, at 157-60 (explaining how, since the July 2 cases, the Court has
“revisited the question of whether executing a particular class of defendants is consistent with the
Eighth Amendment”).
52 See 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“We have concluded that a sentence of
death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.”).
53 See 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
54 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
55 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
56 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S 551, 575 (2005).
57 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (No. 94-8262),
1995 WL 17904041. In a published memorandum, Justice Stevens noted the “importance and
novelty” of this issue. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (memorandum of Stevens, J.,
respecting the denial of certiorari). However, the argument had been raised by inmates long
before Lackey. See, e.g., In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172-74 (1890) (discussing a four-week delay on
death row, but then granting the writ of habeas corpus on grounds that the conviction violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause); Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960) (rejecting the
defendant’s argument that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because of his
imprisonment on death row for over eleven years).
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protracted stay on death row.58 He asserted that his execution would be
cruel and unusual punishment because: (1) imposing the death penalty after
an inordinate delay on death row would have been unacceptable to the
Framers;59 (2) execution after such a delay did not comport with “evolving
standards of decency” and was contrary to international opinion;60 and (3)
Lackey’s delay on death row resulted in the infliction of unnecessary and
gratuitous pain in the form of intense psychological suffering.61
Lackey claims exists because of the numerous delays ingrained in capital
cases, and which result in the incarceration of prisoners for many years
before their death sentences are carried out. As previously mentioned, the
average death row inmate suffers in detention for nearly fifteen years before
execution.62 Some inmates whose petitions for certiorari have reached the
Court since Lackey have spent nearly thirty years waiting for death.63
Beyond the delays that accompany a capital trial, the appellate process is
fraught with additional interruptions.
There are common causes for delay in capital appeals. The assembly of a
complete record for appellate review, the wait for the delivery of an opinion
by appellate courts, and the further procedures provided by most states for
inmates to petition for postconviction relief account for much of the delay
in the appeals process.64 State postconviction relief statutes often provide

58 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 57, at 8 (“This forfeiture has resulted both
from the inordinate amount of time that Mr. Lackey has spent on Texas’ death row and the States’
[sic] unnecessary setting of repeated execution dates in this case.”).
59 See id. at 18-19 (arguing that “if the Framers considered a punishment cruel and unusual in
1789, then a fortiori it is cruel and unusual today,” and quoting then-recent Supreme Court case
law looking to whether, in the Court’s words, his death sentence was one of “those modes or acts
of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was
adopted” (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989) (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405))).
60 See id. at 20-21.
61 See id. at 22-23. In addition to making the arguments listed above, inmates raising a Lackey
claim also typically argue that their execution is cruel and unusual because it “does not further the
penological goals of deterrence and retribution.” Erin Simmons, Comment, Challenging an
Execution after Prolonged Confinement on Death Row [Lackey Revisited], 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1249, 1252 (2009).
62 See SNELL, supra note 20, at 12 tbl.8 (depicting the increase in delays in executions over
the past several decades).
63 In addition to Manuel Valle, who was on death row for thirty-three years, the petitioner in
Thompson v. McNeil for thirty-two years, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1299 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari); the petitioner in Smith v. Arizona for thirty years, 552 U.S. 985, 985
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); and the petitioner in Foster v. Florida
for twenty-seven years, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari).
64 See Jeremy Root, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A Reconsideration of the Lackey
Claim, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 294-96 (2001) (noting that state postconviction
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petitioners with the opportunity to present claims after the direct appeal
process to a trial and an appellate court, and then to the state supreme
court.65 In fact, the requirement that a petitioner exhaust his claim in the
state’s highest court in order to file a petition for federal habeas corpus
relief is another factor contributing to lengthy delays on death row.66
Delays are further exacerbated by “the quest for [competent] counsel”67 and
by other factors such as frivolous filings by the petitioner and the setting of
execution dates, which have the effect of “catalyz[ing] the litigation process
into motion.”68
A Lackey claim’s concern extends beyond the fact of delay—the heart of
the argument relates to the conditions of confinement on death row that
inmates endure for so long as a result of the delays described above. Death
row is characterized by isolation. Justice Stevens highlighted that one
inmate who unsuccessfully asserted a Lackey claim “endured especially
severe conditions” by “spending up to 23 hours per day in isolation in a 6by 9-foot cell.”69 Although the administration of prisons varies by state,
conditions are consistently bleak for death row inmates.70 Many spend
almost all of their time alone in small cells separated from the rest of the
prison population and leave only for medical reasons, consultation with
lawyers, media interviews, or limited opportunities to see visitors.71 As one
justice of the Florida Supreme Court noted, “These facilities and procedures
were not designed and should not be used to maintain prisoners for years
and years.”72
The uncertainty of death that looms over prisoners for years prior to
execution compounds the problem. Today, a number of death row inmates
procedures vary, with some sending petitions directly to the state’s highest court and others
providing numerous rounds of review).
65 See id. at 295-96 (describing different postconviction schemes).
66 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2006). Federal law provides two exceptions to this requirement:
for applicants to whom “there is an absence of available State corrective process,” and in circumstances where “such process [would be] ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” Id.
§ 2254(b)(1)(B).
67 Root, supra note 64, at 294; see id. at 298-99.
68 Id. at 299-301; see also Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence,
46 CASE W. RES. L. REV 1, 10 (1995) (“It should come as no surprise that death penalty cases
take a long time to work through the system. It takes several minutes just to walk through the
steps of a streamlined case, without even discussing the many ways in which the process can be
deliberately prolonged.”).
69 Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1299 (2009) (statement of Stevens, J., respecting
the denial of certiorari).
70 See infra notes 186-92 and accompanying text.
71 See Swafford v. State, 679 So. 2d 736, 742 n.8 (Fla. 1996) (Wells, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
72 Id.
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awaiting execution die instead from natural causes.73 The prospect of
winning on appeal provides many inmates with a “false sense of hope” that
they will not be put to death.74 One justice of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court noted that “[l]engthy delays, especially if punctuated by a
series of last minute reprieves, intensify the prisoner’s suffering.”75 Additionally, a study of inmates on Florida’s death row—where Valle spent three
decades of his life—found that 42% of inmates had “seriously considered”
suicide and 35% had attempted suicide.76 Rather than commit suicide, some
death row inmates instead have volunteered for execution by waiving
appeals of their sentence.77
Unsurprisingly, then, Clarence Lackey described death row as “one of
the loneliest, most miserable places on the earth.”78 Willie Lloyd Turner, a
death row inmate who was executed in 1995, described his experience in
equally bleak terms:
It’s the unending, uninterrupted immersion in death that wears on you so
much. It’s the parade of friends and acquaintances who leave for the death
house and never come back, while your own desperate and lonely time drains
away. It’s the boring routine of claustrophobic confinement, punctuated by
eye-opening dates with death that you helplessly hope will be averted.79

Scholars agree with this depiction of death row. Professor William Schabas
likened the “horror” of death row to a combination of “a hospital ward for the

73 See SNELL, supra note 20, at 8 tbl.1 & n.a (listing the number of prisoners removed from
death row in each state in 2009 and 2010 and noting that fifteen death row inmates died of natural
causes in 2010).
74 Dan Crocker, Note, Extended Stays: Does Lengthy Imprisonment on Death Row Undermine the
Goals of Capital Punishment?, 1 J. GENDER RACE & J UST. 555, 563 (1998) (describing how appeals
or temporary stays of execution often lead prisoners to believe that they will not be executed).
75 Dist. Att’y v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1291 n.5 (Mass. 1980) (Liacos, J., concurring),
superseded by constitutional amendment, MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXVI, amended by amend. CXVI,
as recognized in Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984).
76 Kate McMahon, Dead Man Waiting: Death Row Delays, the Eighth Amendment, and What
Courts and Legislatures Can Do, 25 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 43, 51-52 (2007).
77 See State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 131, 133 (Conn. 2005) (finding that the defendant was competent
and made a “knowing, intelligent and voluntary” waiver of his right to further appeal his death
sentence); see also McMahon, supra note 76, at 50-55 (describing Ross as a powerful illustration of
the psychological impact of death row confinement on inmates).
78 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 57, at 6.
79 Kathleen M. Flynn, Note, The “Agony of Suspense”: How Protracted Death Row Confinement
Gives Rise to an Eighth Amendment Claim of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 291, 296 n.30 (1997) (citation omitted).
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terminally ill, an institution for the criminally insane, and an ultramaximum
security wing in a penitentiary.”80
Many courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have long
recognized—even before Lackey—that the conditions on death row are at
best difficult to endure and at worst what the California Supreme Court has
called “dehumanizing.”81 As far back as 1890 the Supreme Court acknowledged, in reference to just a four-week delay on death row, that the uncertainty of living under a sentence of death is “one of the most horrible
feelings” a person can experience.82 Eighty years later, the California
Supreme Court similarly noted that “the process of carrying out a verdict of
death is often so degrading and brutalizing to the human spirit as to constitute psychological torture.”83
The mental anguish and psychological torture that takes place while
awaiting execution is often referred to as the “death row phenomenon” or
“death row syndrome.”84 This term traces back to Soering v. United Kingdom,
a case decided by the European Court of Human Rights in 1989.85 In
Soering, the defendant, who fled to the United Kingdom after committing a
double murder in Virginia, argued that his extradition to the United States,
which would result in incarceration on death row, would be tantamount to
subjecting him to psychological torture.86 The court agreed.87
Since the term was coined, inmates and advocates have used it to describe
the suffering that occurs on death row. And, as previously mentioned,
judges, scholars, mental health experts, and prison officials agree that “a
condemned prisoner’s mental ordeal approaches the limit of human endur80 William A. Schabas, Developments in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Execution Delayed,
Execution Denied, 5 CRIM. L.F. 180, 184 (1994).
81 See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972) (in bank), superseded by constitutional
amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
82 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890).
83 Anderson, 493 P.2d at 894; see also Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he onset of insanity while awaiting execution of a death sentence is not a rare
phenomenon.”), abrogated by Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
84 Amy Smith, Not “Waiving” but Drowning: The Anatomy of Death Row Syndrome and Volunteering for Execution, 17 B.U. PUB. I NT. L.J. 237, 238 (2008). Although the terms are often used
interchangeably, Smith distinguishes between “death row phenomenon” and “death row syndrome.”
See id. at 242. She defines “death row phenomenon” as a term used to describe “the experience of
living in the harsh conditions of death row for a long period of time under the sentence of death.”
Id. at 238. “Death row syndrome,” on the other hand, is a term “used recently in the legal arena to
describe the psychological effects of death row phenomenon on individuals.” Id.
85 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
86 See id. at 11, 41 (describing the murders and Soering’s fears of psychological trauma on
death row).
87 See id. at 44-45 (“[T]he legitimate purpose of extradition could be achieved by another
means which would not involve suffering of such exceptional intensity or duration.”).
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ance.”88 However, despite the notion of medical legitimacy this terminology
invokes, death row syndrome has not been formally recognized by mental
health professionals.89 Similarly, although the suffering on death row is
widely recognized as problematic, inmates have not succeeded in obtaining
relief from the courts when raising death row syndrome in a Lackey claim.
III. THE COURT’S DEBATE
Although the Court has never granted certiorari in a case raising a Lackey
claim, several Justices have engaged in a lively debate regarding the merits
of the inordinate delay argument. Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens have
consistently urged the Court to confront this issue, which, they claim, finds
support in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.90 Justice Thomas,
however, has concurred on multiple occasions in the denial of certiorari and
has vehemently rejected Lackey claims.91

88 Flynn, supra note 79, at 298; see id. at 298 n.36 (quoting a former warden at San Quentin
prison who said, “[T]he length of time spent [on death row] by [some inmates] constitutes cruelty
that defies the imagination” (second alteration in original) (quoting CLINTON T. DUFFY, EIGHTYEIGHT MEN AND TWO WOMEN 254 (1988))); see also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
89 See Smith, supra note 84, at 243 (noting that, as of 2008, the terms “death row syndrome”
and “death row phenomenon” had not been accepted by the American Psychiatric or Psychological
Associations).
90 See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting
the denial of certiorari) (explaining that, “[t]hough novel, petitioner’s claim is not without
foundation,” because the rationale for the Court’s holding that the Eighth Amendment does not
prohibit capital punishment arguably loses force when a prisoner is forced to spend so many years
on death row).
91 See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 544 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
denial of stay of execution and certiorari) (stating that he is “unaware of any constitutional
support for the [Lackey] argument”); Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1301 (2009) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“It makes ‘a mockery of our system of justice . . . for a
convicted murderer, who, through his own interminable efforts of delay . . . has secured the
almost-indefinite postponement of his sentence, to then claim that the almost-indefinite postponement renders his sentence unconstitutional.” (ellipses in original) (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58
F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., concurring in the judgment))); Foster v. Florida, 537
U.S. 990, 990-91 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“In the three years
since we last debated this meritless claim . . . nothing has changed in our constitutional jurisprudence.”); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of
certiorari) (“I am unaware of any support in the American constitutional tradition or in this
Court’s precedent for the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of
appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed.”).
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A. In Support of Granting Certiorari and Recognizing a Valid Constitutional
Claim Based on Inordinate Delay: Justices Stevens and Breyer
Justices Stevens and Breyer contend that executing inmates who have
long been incarcerated on death row can constitute cruel and unusual
punishment for several reasons. They assert that the amount of time Lackey
petitioners spend awaiting execution—usually between twenty and thirty
years—is undoubtedly unusual when viewed in light of the average length
of death row confinement.92 Justices Stevens and Breyer also rely on the
Court’s previous acknowledgement of the horrors of the death row experience
to support their conclusion that the combination of uncertainty of execution
and lengthy delay is cruel.93
Although Justice Stevens, in his Lackey memorandum, found it proper to
provide lower courts with an opportunity to consider the merits of the
inordinate-delay claim, he also expressed his opinion that the execution of
Clarence Lackey might fail to comport with established Eighth Amendment
principles.94 While the death penalty can be justified on the bases that it
was considered an acceptable punishment by the Framers and that it serves
retributive and deterrent purposes,95 Justice Stevens suspected that “neither
ground retains any force for prisoners who have spent some 17 years under a
sentence of death.”96
In a later case, Justice Breyer echoed Justice Stevens’s doubt as to
whether the penological goals served by the death penalty retain their force
after an inordinate delay. “[T]he longer the delay,” he noted, “the weaker
the justifications for imposing the death penalty in terms of punishment’s
basic retributive or deterrent purposes.”97 Justices Stevens and Breyer have
92 See Foster, 537 U.S. at 992 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari)
(“[Twenty-seven] years awaiting execution is unusual by any standard, even that of current
practice in the United States, where the average executed prisoner spends between 11 and 12 years
under sentence of death.”).
93 See id. (“This Court has recognized that such a combination can inflict ‘horrible feelings’
and ‘an immense mental anxiety amounting to a great increase of the offender’s punishment.’”
(quoting In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890)) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 288-89
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring))); see also supra Part II.
94 See Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045-47 (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
95 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-84 (1976) (plurality opinion) (canvassing the factors
that militate in favor of finding the death penalty constitutional).
96 Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045 (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari);
see also id. (“Such a delay, if it ever occurred, certainly would have been rare in 1789, and thus the
practice of the Framers would not justify a denial of petitioner’s claim. Moreover, after such an
extended time, the acceptable state interest in retribution has arguably been satisfied by the severe
punishment already inflicted.”).
97 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari).
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suggested that the punishment already inflicted on the inmates during their
lengthy imprisonment on death row sufficiently serves states’ interest in
retribution.98 Additionally, they agree that there is minimal incremental
deterrent value in executing an inmate after a long delay on death row as
opposed to simply continuing to incarcerate the prisoner for life.99
Three years after Lackey, petitioner William D. Elledge presented the
same constitutional question to the Court, this time after a twenty-three year
term on death row.100 Justice Breyer, the sole dissenter from the denial of
certiorari, declared, “[P]etitioner argues forcefully that his execution would
be especially ‘cruel.’ Not only has he, in prison, faced the threat of death for
nearly a generation, but he has experienced that delay because of the State’s
own faulty procedures and not because of frivolous appeals on his own
part.”101 Justices Breyer and Stevens have acknowledged in several cases that
identifying the actor responsible for the inmate’s delayed execution—be it
either the State or the petitioner himself—is important in determining the
validity of a petitioner’s Lackey claim. In his Lackey memorandum, Justice
Stevens suggested that “[i]t may be appropriate to distinguish, for example,
among delays resulting from (a) a petitioner’s abuse of the judicial system
by escape or repetitive, frivolous filings; (b) a petitioner’s legitimate
exercise of his right to review; and (c) negligence or deliberate action by the
State.”102 Where most of the delay is attributable to the State, Justice
Stevens suggests and Justice Breyer contends that the prisoner should not
be held responsible, thereby giving greater force to the argument that death
after inordinate delay is cruel and unusual.103
Justice Breyer has used international precedent to support his contention
that execution after inordinate delay is inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment. In Knight v. Florida, he highlighted the fact that “[a] growing number
of courts outside the United States—courts that accept or assume the lawfulness
98 See id.; Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045 (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
99 Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1046 (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
100 Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of

certiorari).
101 Id. at 945.
102 514 U.S. at 1047 (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
103 See id.; Elledge, 525 U.S. at 945 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). In
Elledge, Justice Breyer recognized that the petitioner’s execution would be especially cruel because
the greater part of the prisoner’s twenty-three-year term on death row was attributable to the
State. Id. Justice Breyer calculated that the petitioner’s three successful appeals of his sentence
resulted in eighteen of the total twenty-three years of delay. See id.; see also Knight v. Florida, 528
U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“Where a delay,
measured in decades, reflects the State’s own failure to comply with the Constitution’s demands,
the claim that time has rendered the execution inhuman is a particularly strong one.”); infra
Section V.D.
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of the death penalty—have held that lengthy delay in administering a lawful
death penalty renders ultimate execution inhuman, degrading, or unusually
cruel.”104 For support, Justice Breyer cited decisions from the U.K.’s Privy
Council,105 India,106 Zimbabwe,107 as well as the decision of the European
Court of Human Rights in Soering.108 Justice Breyer maintained that
international opinion is “useful even though not binding” in determining
the constitutionality of such a punishment.109
In 2009, in Thompson v. McNeil, the Court again refused to hear a Lackey
claim, this time raised by a petitioner who had spent thirty-two years on
death row.110 Justice Stevens acknowledged the inherent tension underlying
the claim that execution after a lengthy incarceration on death row violates
the Eighth Amendment. He noted that the due process requirements that
must be observed before an execution may take place render “delays in
state-sponsored killings . . . inescapable,”111 but nevertheless concluded that
executing defendants after such delays is unacceptably cruel. This inevitable
cruelty, coupled with the diminished justification for carrying out an execution after the lapse of so much time, reinforces my opinion that contemporary
decisions “to retain the death penalty as a part of our law are the product of
habit and inattention rather than an acceptable deliberative process.”112

Since Justice Stevens left the Court, Justice Breyer has continued to
advocate, although unsuccessfully, that the Court grant certiorari to consider
a Lackey claim.113

104
105
106
107

528 U.S. at 995 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
Pratt v. Att’y Gen., [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.).
Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 465 (India).
Catholic Comm’n for Justice & Peace in Zimb. v. Att’y-Gen., [1993] 1 Zimb. L.R. 239,
reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 323 (1993).
108 Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
109 Knight, 528 U.S. at 998 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); see id. at 997
(noting that the Supreme Court has often “found particularly instructive opinions of former
Commonwealth nations insofar as those opinions reflect a legal tradition that also underlies our
own Eighth Amendment”). Justice Breyer also observed that international opinion on this issue
varies and cited countries, such as Canada, that do not necessarily condemn the practice of
execution after inordinate delay. Id. at 996.
110 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1299 (2009) (statement of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
111 Id. at 1300.
112 Id. (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 78 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)).
113 See Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of stay)
(voting to grant the application for stay of execution and to grant certiorari to petitioner).
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B. Against Granting Certiorari and Recognizing a Valid Constitutional
Claim Based on Inordinate Delay: Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas entered the debate over the merits of the inordinatedelay claim in 1999.114 In Knight v. Florida, the Court denied certiorari in
two consolidated cases in which defendants challenged the constitutionality
of their executions after spending nineteen and twenty-five years, respectively, on death row.115 In this and every case since in which Justice Thomas
has concurred in the denial of certiorari to petitioners raising a Lackey claim,
he has emphasized his lack of awareness “of any support in the American
constitutional tradition or in this Court’s precedent for the proposition that
a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral
procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed.”116
Unconvinced that the delay between sentencing and execution creates an
Eighth Amendment problem—particularly when this delay is due to the
inmate’s exercise of his right to appeal—Justice Thomas has argued that
“[t]he issue is not whether a death-row inmate’s appeals ‘waive’ any Eighth
Amendment right” but instead whether his “litigation strategy, which
delays his execution, provides a justification for the Court to invent a new
Eighth Amendment right. It does not.”117 Justice Thomas has refused to
accept the argument that a delay in execution can justify the commutation
of a death sentence to life imprisonment. He has noted that the “Court’s
vacatur of a death sentence because of constitutional error does not bar new
sentencing proceedings resulting in a reimposition of the death penalty”:
the Court would not grant such a remedy even “to a death-row inmate who
had suffered the most egregious of constitutional errors in his sentencing
proceedings.”118
Further, Justice Thomas views Justices Breyer and Stevens’s reliance on
the international consensus regarding the unusual cruelty of inordinate
delay as evidence underscoring the absence of support in American constitutional jurisprudence.119 In response to the argument that the conditions of
confinement on death row are “dehumanizing,” Justice Thomas cautions

114
115
116
117
118
119

528 U.S. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
Id. at 993-94 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
Id. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1301 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
See Knight, 528 U.S. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“[W]ere
there any such support in our own jurisprudence, it would be unnecessary for proponents of the
claim to rely on the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the
Supreme Court of India, or the Privy Council.”); infra note 91.
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against second-guessing decisions regarding prison management.120 He also
emphasizes that there could be “legitimate penological reasons” for the
conditions of death row confinement.121 Justice Thomas stresses in Thompson
the “gruesome nature” of the underlying crime for which the defendant was
sentenced to death by three different juries.122 He argues that the only cruel
element in these cases is the defendant’s crime, not the resulting punishment or inevitable delay prior to execution.123
Justice Thomas also advances several arguments against recognizing a
valid Eighth Amendment claim based on inordinate delay. First, he contends that delays in execution are an inherent consequence of the Court’s
death penalty jurisprudence, which provides inmates with an “arsenal” of
constitutional claims.124 Providing death row inmates with another constitutional claim based on delay in execution would only lead to further delays,
and would run the risk of creating perverse incentives for reviewing courts.125
Despite Justice Stevens’s repeated assertion that the denial of a petition for
a writ of certiorari is not a ruling on the merits,126 the Court’s consistent
refusal to consider a Lackey claim suggests that a majority of the Court is
not persuaded that execution after lengthy incarceration on death row
violates Eighth Amendment principles.127

120 See Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1301 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari)
(contemplating the “disastrous consequences of th[e] Court’s recent foray into prison management” in Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005)).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1302 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari); see also id. (admonishing
Justice Stevens for “altogether refus[ing] to take into consideration the gruesome nature of the
crimes that legitimately lead States to authorize the death penalty and juries to impose it”); Foster,
537 U.S. at 991 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (describing the petitioner’s
crime in graphic detail).
123 See Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1303 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“It is
the crime—and not the punishment imposed by the jury or the delay in petitioner’s execution—
that was ‘unacceptably cruel.’” (quoting id. at 1300 (statement of Stevens, J., respecting the denial
of certiorari))).
124 See Knight, 528 U.S. at 992 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (arguing
that it would be incongruous to permit inmates to complain of delay, given that their numerous
opportunities to litigate their claims invariably result in that very delay).
125 See id. (positing that courts may “give short shrift to a capital defendant’s legitimate
claims so as to avoid violating the [suggested] Eighth Amendment right” by lengthening the delay
and running afoul of the Eighth Amendment).
126 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari); see also Knight, 528 U.S. at 990 (statement of Stevens, J., respecting the denial
of certiorari) (“It seems appropriate to emphasize that the denial of these petitions for certiorari
does not constitute a ruling on the merits.”).
127 Justices Stevens and Breyer seem to have conceded this point. See Johnson v. Bredesen,
130 S. Ct. 541, 544 (2009) (statement of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (“Most
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IV. DOES INORDINATE DELAY ON DEATH ROW VIOLATE THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT? CHECKING IN ON THE EXPERIMENT
Five years after Lackey invited the “state and lower courts to serve as
‘laboratories’” to test the “viability” of the Lackey claim, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Knight. Concurring in that denial, Justice Thomas boldly
asserted that “[t]hese courts have resoundingly rejected the claim as meritless . . . [and therefore that] the Court should consider the experiment
concluded.”128 But is this really the case? In an opinion dissenting from the
denial of certiorari, Justice Breyer vehemently disagreed. He argued that
only eight of over twenty cases addressing the issue of inordinate delays in
execution since 1995 were decided solely on the merits of the Lackey claim,
and that most cases “involve[d] procedural failings that in part or in whole
determined the outcome of the case.”129 Further, Justice Breyer pointed out
that the few cases that did address Lackey claims on its merits failed to
consider that much of the delay is attributable to failings of the State rather
than the petitioner.130
A survey of cases in which lower courts confront Lackey claims demonstrates that, in a sense, Justice Thomas is correct. Courts have overwhelmingly rejected Lackey claims over the past sixteen years. However, Justice
Breyer is also correct that the reason for these rejections is mostly procedural.
Lower courts have not considered the merits of this important issue enough
to warrant the conclusion that the experiment is over.
In 2009, Justice Stevens remarked in Johnson v. Bredesen—another case
in which the Court denied certiorari—that when he first discussed the claim
of inordinate delay in Lackey, he did not foresee that procedure would prevent
an individual from arguing that “nearly three decades of delay on death row,
much of it caused by the State, [would] deprive[] a person of his Eighth
Amendment right to avoid cruel and unusual punishment.”131 And indeed,
there have been numerous procedural obstacles barring lower courts from

regrettably, a majority of this Court continues to find these issues not of sufficient weight to merit
our attention.”).
128 Knight, 528 U.S. at 992-93 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari); see id. at
992-93 & n.4 (citing eight state court cases in support of this assertion, and noting that he was
“not aware of a single American court that has accepted such an Eighth Amendment claim”).
129 Id. at 998-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); see id. at 999 (noting
that the experiment had not yet concluded, considering the fact that none of the opinions in the
lower courts “discuss the potential significance of that state responsibility at any length”).
130 See id. at 998-99.
131 130 S. Ct. at 544 (statement of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of stay of execution and
certiorari).
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contemplating the merits of a Lackey claim. This Part will highlight two of
the most common procedural issues encountered by petitioners.
A. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: Lackey Claims Are
Barred If Presented in Second or Successive Habeas Petitions
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)132
presents procedural obstacles to death row inmates seeking to challenge
their execution after long delays on death row. “[D]esigned to limit the role
of the federal courts in what is essentially a state proceeding,” AEDPA
dramatically reformed the process of federal habeas corpus.133
One component of AEDPA—a “gatekeeping” provision—restricts second
or successive petitions for habeas corpus relief.134 The Act provides that “a
claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application . . . that
was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”135 The Supreme
Court noted in Williams v. Taylor that AEDPA was passed “to further the
principles of finality, comity, and federalism.”136 Lackey claims implicate
AEDPA by their very nature. A petitioner’s Lackey claim is not ripe until
the inmate has been confined on death row for many years. Thus, by the
time the petitioner is able to assert a claim based on inordinate delay, he
will have typically already filed his first habeas petition. He will therefore
be forced to make his request for relief in a second or successive petition.137
Many states have similar prohibitions on second or successive habeas
petitions. A similar gatekeeping provision in Utah’s postconviction-relief
statute precluded a petitioner from raising a Lackey claim in state court in
his third petition for postconviction relief.138 In Gardner v. State, the Utah
132
133
134

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
Connolly, supra note 32, at 102.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2006). Prior to AEDPA, “[t]he doctrine of abuse of the writ
define[d] the circumstances in which federal courts decline[d] to entertain a claim presented for
the first time in a second or subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” McCleskey v. Zant,
499 U.S. 467, 470 (1991). A petitioner who failed to raise a claim earlier needed to show “cause for
failing to raise it and prejudice therefrom.” Id. at 494. AEDPA placed narrower restraints on when
courts could entertain claims raised in second or successive petitions. See United States v.
Roberson, 194 F.3d 408, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1999).
135 Id. § 2244(b)(2).
136 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000).
137 See, e.g., Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court’s
holding that petitioner’s claims were covered by AEDPA’s prohibition on second or successive
habeas petitions).
138 Gardner v. State, 234 P.3d 1115, 1136 (Utah 2010) (“We conclude that Mr. Gardner could
have raised these claims in his second state petition for post-conviction relief, filed in state court
in May 2000, or at any other time in the year after this evidence was adduced in 1999, and that he
is therefore barred from raising it in this successive petition.”).
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Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner’s claims could have been
raised in his previous habeas petition and did not become ripe only upon
the defendant’s most recent death warrant.139 Therefore, the court did not
consider the merits of the claim.140
However, AEDPA and similar state provisions contain exceptions to the
second-and-successive-petition rule and therefore do not constitute a complete bar to review of a Lackey claim. Scholars have suggested ways that
courts can still consider the merits of a Lackey claim despite AEDPA. One
has suggested applying the logic of Panetti v. Quarterman, a case involving
claim of incompetency to be executed,141 to a Lackey claim.142 The Panetti
Court stated that because a claim of incompetency does not become ripe
until execution is imminent, AEDPA does not bar such a claim.143 Similarly:
Since a federal court could not resolve an unripe Lackey claim when the first
habeas petition would be filed, allowing this particular class of petitioners
(those who have experienced a prolonged period of confinement prior to
their proposed execution) to file second or successive habeas petitions would
simply not implicate AEDPA’s concern for finality.144

However, the Panetti approach has not been applied to a Lackey claim, and
as a result AEDPA has prevented the consideration of the constitutionality
of inordinate delay.
B. Retroactivity: Lackey Claims Are Teague-Barred
In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme Court announced that the law at the
time a petitioner’s judgment became final is the law that should apply to the
adjudication of his constitutional claims in habeas proceedings.145 Writing
for the Court in a part of the opinion joined by three other Justices in
139 See id. at 1143-44 & nn.232-35; see id. at 1144 (determining that the defendant could have
raised a Lackey claim in an earlier petition for postconviction relief because “at the time [he] filed
his second state petition for post-conviction relief, he had been incarcerated for more than
fourteen years”).
140 Id. at 1144.
141 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
142 See Simmons, supra note 61, at 1266.
143 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 945-48 (2007) (“We are hesitant to construe a statute, implemented to
further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism, in a manner that would require
unripe . . . claims to be raised as a mere formality . . . .”).
144 Simmons, supra note 61, at 1266.
145 See 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (“[H]abeas corpus cannot be used
as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those rules would be
applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral review through one of the two exceptions we
have articulated.”).
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Teague, Justice O’Connor articulated two narrow exceptions to this rule. A
new rule of law should be retroactively applied if such a rule “places ‘certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe.’”146 Additionally, “a new rule
should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of ‘those
procedures that . . . “are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”’”147
In determining whether a petitioner’s claim is Teague-barred, courts
must first ascertain when the defendant’s conviction and sentence became
final.148 Next, the court must assess whether a state court considering the
defendant’s claim at the time “would have felt compelled by existing
precedent to conclude that the rule [defendant] seeks was required by the
Constitution.”149 Finally, the court must determine whether the new rule
falls within one of the narrow exceptions articulated in Teague.150
Teague appears to preclude Lackey claims automatically. It is almost inconceivable that a claim of inordinate delay could develop before an inmate’s
conviction and sentence becomes final, and there is no binding precedent
for holding that an inordinate delay in execution violates the Eighth
Amendment. A petitioner asserting a Lackey argument would require a new
rule of constitutional law to be successful.151
Indeed, federal courts have read Teague to bar them from considering
Lackey claims. For example, the Ninth Circuit dismissed a Lackey claim of a
petitioner who spent twenty-five years on death row in Montana because
“at the time his conviction became final [a court] would not have felt
compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] sought was
required by the Constitution.”152
146 Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in two judgments and dissenting in a third)).
147 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in two
judgments and dissenting in a third) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))).
148 See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (“A state conviction and sentence become
final for purposes of retroactivity analysis when the availability of direct appeal to the state courts
has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has elapsed or a timely
filed petition has been finally denied.”).
149 Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990).
150 See Caspari, 510 U.S. at 390.
151 See Simmons, supra note 61, at 1263 (noting that at first blush the Lackey claim might
appear to be Teague-barred “because it requests application of a new constitutional rule to a
judgment that has long since become final”).
152 Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Allen v. Ornoski, 435
F.3d 946, 955 (9th Cir. 2006) (determining that “[t]here is no clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court, to support” the petitioner’s claim). The Fifth Circuit has also
ruled that the Lackey claim—indeed, the original Lackey claim—is Teague-barred. That court
vacated the district court’s stay of Clarence Lackey’s execution in 1995, noting that “Teague’s
n0onretroactivity doctrine bars Lackey’s current claim.” Lackey v. Scott, 52 F.3d 98, 100 (5th
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But Teague need not serve as a bar to Lackey claims. One author suggests
that the procedural hurdle posed in Teague does not apply if the petitioner
characterizes his Lackey claim as a “demand for relief for a post-conviction
constitutional violation” as opposed to a collateral attack on the petitioner’s
final judgment.153 If a court agrees with this argument, then Teague does not
apply.154 Alternatively, a petitioner could clear the Teague hurdle by claiming
that one of Teague’s two exceptions applies. The new rule required by a
Lackey claim arguably satisfies either exception.155 A Lackey claim could
satisfy the first Teague exception because it is supported by substantive
constitutional law and “does not propose a new rule of criminal procedure.”156 Further, a Lackey claim falls within the first exception to Teague
given that it places a class of individuals—death row prisoners with lengthy
delays—beyond the state’s power to execute.157 In Penry v. Lynaugh, the
Court determined that Teague did not prevent it from considering the
merits of the defendant’s argument that his execution would violate the
Eighth Amendment given that he had the “reasoning capacity of a 7-yearold.”158 Writing for a unanimous Court,159 Justice O’Connor explained that
the defendant’s claim fell within the first Teague exception because “a new
rule placing a certain class of individuals beyond the State’s power to punish
by death is analogous to a new rule placing certain conduct beyond the
State’s power to punish at all.”160 Alternatively, the Lackey claim might
satisfy the second Teague exception because the claim rests on the fundamental constitutional principles underlying the Eighth Amendment’s ban
on cruel and unusual punishment.161 A court’s acceptance of either of these
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 514 U.S. 1093 (1995); see also Chambers v. Dretke, 145 F. App’x 468, 472 (5th
Cir. 2005) (declaring that the district court’s resolution that petitioner’s claim was Teague-barred
was “not debatable.”).
153 Simmons, supra note 61, at 1263; see Flynn, supra note 79, at 316 (“Although prisoners raise
Lackey claims collaterally through habeas petitions, these claims do not attack the constitutionality
of initial state court proceedings, but instead seek relief for the state’s postjudgment action.”
(footnote omitted)).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1264.
156 Id.
157 See Flynn, supra note 79, at 317 (“Because Lackey claims propose that lengthy death row
incarceration renders a class of death row prisoners constitutionally ineligible for the death
penalty, such claims should escape Teague’s bar under this exception.” (footnote omitted)).
158 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989).
159 All the Justices joined in Part IV-A of Justice O’Connor’s opinion. See id. at 306.
160 Id. at 330. Justice O’Connor further noted that “[i]n both cases, the Constitution itself
deprives the State of the power to impose a certain penalty, and the finality and comity concerns . . .
have little force.” Id.
161 Simmons, supra note 61, at 1264; see Flynn, supra note 79, at 318 (“Teague doctrine permits
retroactive application of new rules concerning bedrock constitutional principles ‘implicit in the

886

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 861

arguments would provide an opportunity to consider the substantive merits
of the Lackey claim.
Thus, although Teague has prevented some courts from reaching the
merits of a Lackey claim, it is possible for a court to review a Lackey claim by
construing Teague’s limits as inapplicable.
Overall, procedural issues dispose of a number of Lackey claims without
consideration of the claim’s substantive arguments. The procedural issues
have been compounded by Justice Thomas’s declaration in Knight that the
experiment in the lower courts had “concluded”162—an assertion that has
further discouraged lower court judges from considering petitioners’
arguments in support of their Lackey claims.163 Justice Thomas’s assertion
has become somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy—not because courts have
agreed with his assessment of the Lackey claim after careful consideration,
but because procedure has stood in the way of a careful review of the claim
by state and lower federal courts.
In lieu of lower courts, academics have stepped in to undertake an indepth analysis of the Lackey claim. Several authors have persuasively argued
that despite the limited treatment of the Lackey claim in the lower courts, an
inordinate delay between death sentences and execution does violate established Eighth Amendment principles.164 Many have urged the Supreme
Court to declare such delays unconstitutional, and their arguments closely
track those raised by Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer.165 Execution after
long delays on death row violates the Eighth Amendment and fails to meet
the standard set forth in Furman and Gregg, because execution under these
circumstances would have been unacceptable to the Framers and lacks a
robust retributive or deterrent justification.166
concept of ordered liberty.’ The Lackey claim rests on the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment, a fundamental constitutional guarantee.” (footnotes and citation omitted)).
162 See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of
certiorari).
163 See, e.g., Bieghler v. State, 839 N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ind. 2005) (“We also noted Justice
Thomas’s subsequent observation in Knight v. Florida that Lackey claims had been rejected by the
courts that have considered them.” (citations omitted)).
164 See, e.g., Aarons, supra note 35, at 206; Dwight Aarons, Getting Out of this Mess: Steps Toward
Addressing and Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 40
(1998) (noting that a capital defendant’s “Eighth Amendment . . . claim is analogous to a claim
based on the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial”); Root, supra note 64, at 316-17 (“The
central tenet of the Eighth Amendment claim is that an execution after a period of inordinate
delay no longer serves any legitimate social purpose. Indeed, lengthy delays would have been
unimaginable to the framers of the constitution, so they cannot be justified via the framers’ intent.”).
165 See, e.g., Connolly, supra note 32, at 116-30; Flynn, supra note 79, at 332-33.
166 Jessica Feldman, Comment, A Death Row Incarceration Calculus: When Prolonged Death
Row Imprisonment Becomes Unconstitutional, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 187, 199 (1999) (“If the
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V. SOLUTIONS
As Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer suggest, inordinate delay on death
row can run afoul of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.167 However, numerous procedural obstacles have stunted the
“experiment” which began in the lower courts over fifteen years ago. As a
result, the Supreme Court has been hesitant to consider the arguments
raised by death row inmates challenging delayed executions.
Scholars have proposed solutions to facilitate courts’ consideration of
the merits of a Lackey claim. For example, one author recommended that
courts treat the Lackey claim as a matter of first impression, because so few
courts have actually substantively opined on the constitutionality of inordinate delay.168
While litigants should continue to seek validation of Lackey claims in the
courts, legislative solutions are also available. This Part briefly discusses
three broad solutions that, although not wholly responsive to the Lackey
problem, could provide relief to inmates or prevent future inordinate delays.
It then outlines more narrowly tailored measures that legislatures should
adopt to solve the Lackey problem.
A. Abolishing the Death Penalty
One obvious way to dispose of the inordinate delay problem is to eliminate capital punishment altogether. As scholars Carol Steiker and Jordan
Steiker observe, “[T]he significance of the [issue raised by the Lackey claim]
is the way in which it highlights the ‘American capital punishment phenomenon’—the prevailing fragility of the death penalty in this country given the
ongoing, pronounced inability of states to consummate death sentences with
executions.”169

Framers did not intend prisoners to sit on death row for years awaiting execution, and if neither
retribution nor deterrence is served by executing prisoners after a lengthy delay, then an execution
after such a delay fails the Gregg test and conflicts with the Eighth Amendment.”).
167 See Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1299 (2009) (statement of Stevens, J., respecting
the denial of certiorari) (“[B]oth Justice Breyer and I have noted that substantially delayed
executions arguably violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.”).
168 See McMahon, supra note 76, at 59-62 (“The simple reality is that more states than not
haven’t encountered this issue and are now barred from seriously considering it.”).
169 Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A Century of Discontinuous
Debate, 100 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 685-86 (2010).
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Opponents of state-sanctioned killing have long advocated abolition of
capital punishment for reasons beyond those behind the Lackey problem.
Several Supreme Court Justices—including Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens—have concluded that capital punishment is per se unconstitutional.170
Additionally, popular support for the death penalty has waned in recent
years; in 2011, it dropped to its lowest level since 1972, the year that Georgia’s
capital punishment scheme was declared unconstitutional in Furman.171
Recently, several states have initiated legislation to repeal the death
penalty. In 2011, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn signed legislation abolishing
the death penalty and commuted fifteen death sentences to life without
parole following a decade-long moratorium on executions.172 Following on
the heels of states like New Jersey and New Mexico, Illinois became the
sixteenth state to eliminate capital punishment.173 Quinn’s belief is that “[i]t
is impossible to create a perfect system, free of all mistakes . . . [and that]
it’s the right and just thing to abolish the death penalty and punish those

170 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 369-72
(Marshall, J., concurring) (concluding that “capital punishment cannot stand”). In Gregg v.
Georgia, Justice Stewart wrote for a plurality of the Court:

Although this issue [of whether capital punishment is per se unconstitutional] was
presented and addressed in Furman, it was not resolved by the Court. Four Justices
[Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist] would have held that capital punishment
is not unconstitutional per se; two Justices [Brennan and Marshall] would have
reached the opposite conclusion; and three Justices [Douglas, Stewart, and White],
while agreeing that the statutes then before the Court were invalid as applied, left
open the question whether such punishment may ever be imposed.
428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted). Justice Stevens has voiced this
opinion more recently. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“I have relied on my own experience in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of
the death penalty represents ‘the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.’” (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 312
(White, J., concurring))). “With his concurring opinion in Baze, Justice Stevens became the fifth
Gregg Justice to declare that capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.” Elisabeth
Semel, Reflections on Justice John Paul Stevens’s Concurring Opinion in Baze v. Rees: A Fifth Gregg
Justice Renounces Capital Punishment, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 783, 791 (2010).
171 See Frank Newport, In U.S., Support for Death Penalty Falls to 39-Year Low, GALLUP (Oct. 13,
2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150089/support-death-penalty-falls-year-low.aspx (noting that this
poll was taken soon after the controversial execution of Troy Davis in Georgia, although “highprofile executions” in previous years were not accompanied by similar decreases in support for
capital punishment).
172 See Illinois Abolishes the Death Penalty, NPR (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/
09/134394946/illinois-abolishes-death-penalty.
173 States with and without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
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who commit heinous crimes—evil people—with life in prison without
parole or any chance of release.”174
In 2012, legislators introduced abolition bills in eleven states, including
Connecticut, Georgia, Nebraska, Missouri, Maryland, Kentucky, and Kansas,
although only one successfully passed:175 On April 25, 2012, Connecticut
became the seventeenth state to abolish the death penalty.176 Governor
Dannel P. Malloy signed into law legislation that repealed capital punishment for future crimes—although this law does not apply to the eleven men
currently imprisoned on death row in the state.177 Malloy stated that he
“came to believe that doing away with the death penalty was the only way
to ensure it would not be unfairly imposed.”178 Malloy cited the fact that the
eleven men currently on death row in Connecticut “are far more likely to
die of old age than be put to death” to underscore the unworkability of the
state’s death penalty law.179 Abolition bills have also been proposed in
Maryland and Texas for 2013, and legislators in several other states plan to
introduce similar bills this session.180
While this trend is gaining momentum, it is extremely unlikely that the
thirty-three states that still impose the death penalty will all abolish the
practice.181 Even still, the repeal of capital punishment and commutation of
death sentences to life sentences could provide relief to prisoners who have
suffered as a result of their lengthy confinement on death row.

174 Ray Long & Todd Wilson, Gov. Pat Quinn Turned to Bible and Writings of Late Cardinal
Joseph Bernardin for Difficult Death Penalty Decision, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 10, 2011), http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/2011-03-10/news/ct-met-illinois-death-penalty-bill-si20110309_1_death-penalty-patquinn-families-of-murder-victims.
175 2012—Legislation, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/2012Legislation (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (listing state-by-state legislation (proposed and/or passed in
2012) regarding the death penalty).
176 Daniela Altimari, Without Fanfare, Malloy Signs Bill Abolishing Death Penalty, HARTFORD
COURANT (Apr. 25, 2012), http://articles.courant.com/2012-04-25/news/hc-death-penalty-signing0426-20120425_1_death-penalty-gail-canzano-capital-punishment.
177 Id.
178 Recent Legislation: Governor’s Signature Makes Connecticut Fifth State in Five Years to End
Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/recent-legislationgovernors-signature-makes-connecticut-fifth-state-five-years-end-death-penalty (last visited Jan.
11, 2013).
179 Id.
180 See Recent Legislative Activity, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/recent-legislative-activity (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (listing recent state-by-state legislation
(proposed and passed) regarding the death penalty).
181 This scenario is particularly unlikely, as some of the remaining states—such as California,
Texas, and Florida—have the largest populations on death row. See DEATH ROW U.S.A., supra
note 21, at 32-61 (listing the number of death row inmates per state).
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B. Reforming the Capital Appeals and Habeas Processes
There are numerous countervailing policy considerations that caution
courts and legislatures against adopting bright-line rules or quick fixes to
solve the problems associated with inordinate delays on death row.182
Unlike those who advocate abolishing the death penalty, other scholars who
favor capital punishment propose reforms to streamline the capital appeals
and habeas process out of the recognition that this part of the litigation
cycle accounts for much of the delay on death row.
Some scholars have proposed alternatives that could prevent future
Lackey violations by making the system more efficient. State legislatures
should consider implementing some of these suggestions in order to help
avoid future Lackey claims. For example, a provision providing funding,
training, and resources for those who represent indigent defendants could
reduce the likelihood of ineffective assistance. However, Professor Eve
Brensike Primus argues that such reforms are unlikely to occur—or if they
were to occur, that they would be unlikely to wholly solve the problem.183
Instead, Professor Primus suggests a structural reform that would help
alleviate the problems associated with ineffectiveness of counsel, an issue
which many inmates raise in collateral challenges to their conviction and
sentences.184 Specifically, she recommends allowing the issue of ineffective
assistance to be raised by attorneys on direct appeal, rather than requiring
defendants to make this claim only on postconviction review.185 Although
this change could ensure that future prisoners do not spend the staggering
amount of time on death row that many do now, these suggestions will not
help those currently raising Lackey claims find recognition of their constitutional challenge or relief from their suffering.
C. Improving Death Row Conditions
Although it is not a complete solution, another way to partially resolve
the problems underlying the Lackey claim is to improve the conditions of
confinement on death row. Around the time that Justice Stevens issued his
Lackey memorandum, scholars Robert Johnson and John L. Carroll observed
182 For example, there are perverse incentives for reviewing courts (raised by Justice Thomas
in Knight), as well as incentives for inmates to file frivolous claims purposefully to delay incarceration
on death row as a predicate for raising a Lackey claim later. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying
text.
183 See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 684, 706 (2007).
184 Id. at 706-09.
185 Id. at 706.
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that “the treatment of death-row prisoners has not kept pace with the
development of their rights on appeal. . . . What formerly was a brief but
debilitating experience has now become a seemingly endless and agonizing
one.”186 Conditions are uniformly stark on death rows across the country.187
In addition to the emotional stress that stems from awaiting execution,
death row inmates further suffer in “a prison within a prison, physically and
socially isolated from the prison community and the outside world.”188
Professor Melvin Urofsky posited that “[i]f one is going to argue that even
condemned murderers retain some spark of humanity, some rights of
individual autonomy, then something must be done to either improve death
row conditions, or permit those who wish to terminate that existence
through execution of sentence the right to do so.”189
Despite the political unpopularity of providing additional resources and
funding to death row inmates, some states have initiated successful reforms
to improve conditions on death row. An example of early reform took place in
Tucker, Arkansas, in 1968, prior to the Furman decision.190 Death row inmates
were provided with the opportunity to integrate with the rest of the prison
population during meals and other activities, and were also given extended
recreational, visitation, and other privileges.191 In the mid-1980s, the Texas
Department of Corrections began classifying death row inmates as either
“death row work-capable” or “death row segregation,” and members of the
former category were permitted to work in a factory or as janitors or orderlies
during their period of incarceration.192 And the Missouri Department of
186 Robert Johnson & John L. Carroll, Litigating Death Row Conditions: The Case for Reform, in
PRISONERS AND THE LAW 8-3 (Ira P. Robbins ed., Release no. 31, 2004); see also Melvin I.
Urofsky, A Right to Die: Termination of Appeal for Condemned Prisoners, 75 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553, 568-73 (1984) (detailing the horrid conditions of death row that often lead prisoners
to waive their appeals).
187 See Johnson & Carroll, supra note 186, at 8-4 (“Death-row living conditions vary little
from state to state.”); see also supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. But see Mary A. Fischer,
The Appeal of Death Row, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2011, at 21 (discussing how one prisoner
would prefer to be sentenced to death as he knows that an actual execution is unlikely, and living
conditions on death row are better).
188 Urofsky, supra note 186, at 571 (quoting ROBERT J OHNSON, CONDEMNED TO DIE:
LIFE UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH 47 (1981)).
189 Id. at 573.
190 See George Lombardi, Richard D. Sluder & Donald Wallace, The Management of DeathSentenced Inmates: Issues, Realities, and Innovative Strategies 6 (Mar. 1996) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://doc.mo.gov/documents/DeathSentencedInmates.pdf (discussing dramatic death
row reforms under the leadership of Warden Tom Murton).
191 See id. (discussing this successful but brief reform, which was eventually dismantled by
the Arkansas Board of Corrections).
192 See id. (“Although the program was initially met with skepticism by staff, no serious incidents were reported following implementation of reforms.” (citations omitted)).
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Corrections reformed its management of death row inmates following a
class action suit alleging constitutional deprivations. After entering into a
consent decree, the department began classifying death row inmates into
one of three custody levels with corresponding levels of privileges: regular
custody, close custody, or no-contact custody.193
In determining appropriate legislative responses to this problem, policymakers should balance considerations of institutional safety and security,
the penological purposes that underlie the current structure of death row,
and the fundamental needs of prisoners. Policymakers should also engage in
an evaluation of the appropriate conditions on death row in light of the
statistical data about the length of time inmates currently spend awaiting
execution. Implementing even minor changes could provide significant
benefits to death row inmates and alleviate some of the concerns that lie at
the heart of the Lackey claim. However, such reforms provide only limited
relief of the problem posed by inordinate delay, because “the mental
suffering and anxiety caused by uncertainty of the final disposition of the
sentence is an inherent characteristic of death row.”194
D. Model Lackey Legislation
With the exception of eliminating the death penalty altogether, the other
alternatives presented here provide only limited help to current inmates or
serve to prevent inordinate delays in the future. Although these reforms and
proposals merit careful consideration by state legislatures, I propose a more
narrowly tailored solution that precisely identifies which inmates are
eligible for relief based on inordinate delay on death row and provides relief
by commuting their death sentences to sentences of life without parole in
certain circumstances.
Professor Dwight Aarons proposes setting a date—twice the national
average amount of time spent on death row—at which point an inmate’s
Lackey claim becomes ripe, and his execution may run afoul of the Eighth
Amendment.195 I propose adopting Aarons’s timeframe, but for a slightly
different purpose. Incarceration for twice the national average, which today
would be around twenty-nine years,196 should trigger an automatic review of
the inmate’s time on death row by the state supreme court. The court
193
194
195

Id.
Feldman, supra note 166, at 209 n.197.
See Aarons, supra note 35, at 207 (“While inordinate delay need not be strictly defined as
twice the national average, this proposed bright line rule represents a choice that provides a ready
reference point for capital cases.”).
196 See SNELL, supra note 20, at 12 tbl.8 (178 months times two).
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should then determine if continued incarceration and execution would
violate the Eighth Amendment. The court would be tasked with creating a
report that breaks down the procedural history of the prisoner’s case and
details the inmate’s time on death row.197 This review should not burden the
court, as the relevant information is readily available in court dockets and
filings and requires minimal independent investigation.
This analysis is critical to my further proposal operationalizing Justice
Stevens’s recommendation in Lackey that the court consider the meaningful
differences among delays caused by the inmate’s frivolous filings, the
legitimate exercise of an inmate’s rights, and negligence or error by the
state.198 The leading cause of the inmate’s delay should be the determinative
factor in considering whether a constitutional violation has occurred.199
1. Delay Caused by the Inmate’s Abuse of the Judicial System
If the leading cause of a prisoner’s delay is, to use Justice Stevens’s language, “a petitioner’s abuse of the judicial system by escape or repetitive,
frivolous filings,”200 then no Eighth Amendment violation has occurred.
This inquiry will focus on the petitioner’s abuse of the legal system by
escape or repetitive filings, as it is unlikely that a court would characterize a
claim, even a claim that may ordinarily be considered far-fetched, as
frivolous.201 This is due to the fact that a lawyer’s ethical obligations to her
client in a capital case require her to assert a claim based on “any conceivable
error.”202 Further, while this provision serves as an important safeguard,
197 While this task can be delegated to administrative staff or another body, the court needs
to assess the constitutional issue.
198 See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting
the denial of certiorari) (noting how English jurists have made similar distinctions based on the
cause of delay) (citing Pratt v. Att’y Gen., [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) 33 (appeal taken from Jam.)).
199 The leading cause of delay is to be determined by the judge based on the report which
will detail each inmate’s time on death row. This inquiry is akin to the type of causation determinations judges make on a regular basis. Judges are therefore best suited to inquire into which cause
accounts for more years of delay than any other.
200 Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047 (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
201 A frivolous claim has been defined by the court as one that is “clearly baseless”—this
definition “encompass[es] allegations that are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’” Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (citations omitted). Although this definition is already a
narrow one, especially in criminal cases “courts are loath to impose sanctions [for filing frivolous
claims] against lawyers in any case in which the defendant’s liberty is at stake.” Monroe H.
Freedman, The Professional Obligation to Raise Frivolous Issues in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1167, 1177-78 (2003).
202 Id. at 1177-79 (“Counsel in a capital case must, as a matter of professional responsibility,
raise every issue at every level of the proceedings that might conceivably persuade even one judge
in an appeals court, or in the Supreme Court . . . .”).
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frivolous filings are unlikely to be the leading cause for many inmates who
have experienced delays of twenty-nine years. “[F]rivolous petitions
account for an infinitesimal fraction” of delays in comparison to other
causes of delay in the criminal justice system.203 The system has mechanisms in place to prevent frivolous claims from being filed, including
procedural rules and sanctions.204 In any case, the filing of a frivolous petition
is unlikely to cause a delay of any significant length. One author notes that
“[w]hen petitions that appear to be frivolous are filed, they are either dismissed without comment . . . or they are resoundingly condemned.”205
Ensuring that an Eighth Amendment claim is not available to an inmate
who caused his own delay would address Justice Thomas’s fear that recognizing a Lackey claim would incentivize inmates to abuse the system so that
they could later raise a claim based on the resulting delay. Indeed, it is
critically important to distinguish between delays caused by the inmate and
delays caused by other factors in order to ensure that relief granted to
Lackey petitioners goes only to those who are deserving. A rigorous inquiry
to this effect will prevent capital defense lawyers from purposefully dragging out the postconviction litigation process.206
2. Delay Caused by the Process of Judicial Review
If the leading cause of a prisoner’s delay is the prisoner’s “legitimate
exercise of his right to review,”207 then no constitutional violation has
occurred. This measure also accounts for the inherent delays that result
from the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence and the modern capital
appeals process. It reflects the fact that thorough and sometimes repeated
review of a prisoner’s claims is an integral part of the system which serves
the compelling interest of ensuring accuracy. This time is essentially
“neutral”—while death row inmates should not be “punished” by delays if
they pursue appeals to which they are entitled, neither should this time be
203
204

Root, supra note 64, at 299.
See Aarons, supra note 35, at 46-47 (suggesting that frivolous filings are rare in capital
cases, and noting that “[s]ignificiantly, it is hard to find reported cases imposing such sanctions”);
Root, supra note 64, at 299 (“There is an extensive network of procedural rules in place that
discourages the filing of frivolous, premature, or otherwise inappropriate petitions.”).
205 Id.
206 See David Margolick, At the Bar: Death Row Appeals Are Drawing Sharp Rebukes from Frustrated Federal Judges in the South, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1988, at B9 (“Unable to abolish capital
punishment de jure, they are attempting it de facto, by making the process so protracted that it
will ultimately be abandoned.”).
207 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari).
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counted against the state by a court assessing a Lackey claim. Additionally,
this proposition further alleviates concerns that recognizing a Lackey claim
would incentivize the judiciary to hastily review a prisoner’s claim lest the
delay cause a constitutional violation.208
3. Delay Caused by the State’s Misconduct or Negligence
If the leading cause of a prisoner’s delay is the state’s “negligence or deliberate action,”209 then the prisoner’s sentence should be commuted to life
without parole. Undoubtedly, the most compelling case for relief based on a
Lackey claim arises when the State has protracted a prisoner’s stay on death
row.210 For example, a Lackey claim would be recognized in cases with facts
similar to those of Johnson v. Bredesen. In Johnson, a change in state law gave
the petitioner access to evidence undermining eyewitness testimony against
him eleven years after his conviction.211 Justice Stevens, dissenting from the
denial of certiorari, explained that “[t]his evidence calls into question the
persuasive force of the eyewitness’ testimony, and, consequently, whether
Johnson’s conviction was infected with constitutional error.”212 He observed
that “[w]e cannot know as a definitive matter whether, if the State had not
withheld exculpatory evidence, Johnson would have been convicted of these
crimes. We do know that Johnson would not have waited for 11 years on
death row before the State met its disclosure obligations.”213
But what players or institutions constitute “the State”? This term would
incorporate those directly involved with the prosecution of the case, such as
the district attorneys. Additionally, it would include the executive branch.214
Therefore, moratoria imposed by governors would count against the state in
the assessment of a Lackey claim, as they usually reflect a state’s inability—
albeit a temporary one—to execute inmates constitutionally. In California,
for example, state officials requested more time before judicial review of a

208 See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of
certiorari).
209 Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047 (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
210 See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 542 (2009) (statement of Stevens, J., respecting
the stay of execution and denial of certiorari) (“[S]tate-caused delay in state-sponsored killings can
be unacceptably cruel.”).
211 See id.
212 Id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
213 Id.
214 The term would not include the Judiciary insofar as the action by the state is simply judicial
decisionmaking. Intentional misconduct on the part of the Judiciary that results in an inmate’s
delay, however, would be counted against the state in assessing a Lackey claim.
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new lethal injection procedure, so the state was unable to seek any executions
in 2011.215
Finally, as one last safeguard to assure relief to inmates deserving a commutation to a life sentence, I propose including a safety valve that enables
courts to grant relief to a petitioner whose leading cause of delay is not
negligence or deliberate action by the state. This procedure would be used,
for example, in a circumstance where the petitioner’s legitimate exercise of
his right to review is the leading cause of delay, but state misconduct also
played a substantial role or was particularly egregious. This very narrow
carve-out would permit courts to grant relief based on equitable principles,
and—in keeping with the Court’s consideration of equitable principles—
would only be used sparingly.216
CONCLUSION
Just as the process of consummating a death sentence is fraught with
complicated issues that lead to numerous delays, so the Lackey claim itself is
inextricably bound up with difficult procedural and policy questions.
Because the Court remains unwilling to confront this issue head on, it is
critical that states seek alternative solutions to the problems posed by
inordinate death row delays. States must take action to address the concerns
related to the Lackey claim. But they have many options for doing so,
whether by reforming the prison system or their postconviction-relief
processes, or even by eliminating capital punishment altogether. By using
Justice Stevens’s framework as a model for crafting legislation to address
the growing problem of death row delays, it is possible, at long last, to
balance the competing concerns surrounding the Lackey claim and to
provide a workable solution for both states and inmates.

215 See Carol J. Williams, State Won’t Execute Anyone in 2011, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 2011, at A1
(“The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation requested more time because San
Quentin State Prison’s new warden, Michael Martel, wants to recruit a new execution team to
replace the one that was assembled and trained last year . . . .”).
216 See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (“Federal courts have typically extended equitable relief only sparingly.”). Kate McMahon has also recommended legislation
to address the problems that arise from the “death row syndrome”; in addition to the proposals
outlined in this paper, I recommend following McMahon’s suggestion that legislation support
appropriate alternatives, such as clemency. See McMahon, supra note 76, at 74-75 (“[L]egislation
should nonetheless continue to provide a clemency appeal option for that very narrow set of cases
that might be able to benefit from it, but it should not presume that clemency adequate [sic]
fulfills the function that an Eighth Amendment inordinate delay challenge does.”).

